Independent Special Prosecutor v. Kisswani (2024): Difference between revisions
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| FullName=[[Aiden Burke|Aiden Michael Burke]], [[Independent Special Prosecutor]] v. [[Hana Kisswani]] | | FullName=[[Aiden Burke|Aiden Michael Burke]], [[Independent Special Prosecutor]] v. [[Hana Kisswani]] | ||
| Citation=F-24-059 | | Citation=F-24-059 | ||
| Opinion=https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rKNFY5WcEwUEVwPSKmgEl2EIVolFZZYb/view?usp=sharing| Prior=Original action filed in Central Student Judiciary. | | Opinion=https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rKNFY5WcEwUEVwPSKmgEl2EIVolFZZYb/view?usp=sharing| Prior=Original action filed in the Central Student Judiciary. | ||
| Majority=Lobbezoo | | Majority=Lobbezoo | ||
| JoinMajority=Farmer, Bidari | | JoinMajority=Farmer, Bidari | ||
| Concurrence=Lobbezoo | | Concurrence=Lobbezoo | ||
| JoinConcurrence=Bidari | | JoinConcurrence=Bidari | ||
| QuestionsPresented = (1) Do monetary limits on accepting campaign donations violate the Free Speech Clause of the [[All-Campus Constitution]]; and<br>(2) do monetary limits on campaign expenditures violate the Free Speech Clause of the [[All-Campus Constitution]]? | |||
| Holding = The [[Compiled Code]] regulates only the making of donations, not the acceptance of donations. Campaign expenditure limits are unconstitutional. The complaint is dismissed. | |||
| LawsApplied=[[All-Campus Constitution|A.C. Const. art. VIII]]; [[Elections Code |Compiled Code art. IV]] § 7.4.1.2, 7.5.1 | | LawsApplied=[[All-Campus Constitution|A.C. Const. art. VIII]]; [[Elections Code |Compiled Code art. IV]] § 7.4.1.2, 7.5.1 | ||
| | | Related = [[Parikh v. University Elections Commission (2012)|''Parikh v. UEC'' (2012)]] | ||
}} | }} | ||
'''''Independent Special Prosecutor v. Kisswani''''' | |||
'''''Independent Special Prosecutor v. Kisswani''''', F-24-059 (2024), was a landmark decision of the [[Central Student Judiciary]]. The case concerned [[Hana Kisswani]], a School of Social Work Assembly candidate who accepted a donation from her non-student sister and exceeded CSG’s Campaign Expenditure Limit. The Court held that a rule prohibiting donations from non-students did not apply to candidates' acceptance of such donations, and only prohibited non-students from making donations. More significantly, the Court struck down the Candidate Expenditure Limit as unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the [[All-Campus Constitution]], applying [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strict%20scrutiny strict scrutiny] and effectively abrogating [[Parikh v. University Elections Commission (2012)|''Parikh v. UEC'' (2012)]]. | |||
== Background == | == Background == | ||
During the [[Fall 2024 elections|fall 2024 elections]], Independent Special Prosecutor [[Aiden Burke]] filed a complaint against [[Hana Kisswani]], a candidate for the School of Social Work's single Assembly seat. The complaint alleged that Kisswani violated two provisions of the Compiled Code: the prohibition on donations from non-students and the candidate expenditure limit. | During the [[Fall 2024 elections|fall 2024 elections]], [[Independent Special Prosecutor]] [[Aiden Burke]] filed a complaint against [[Hana Kisswani]], a candidate for the School of Social Work's single Assembly seat. The complaint alleged that Kisswani violated two provisions of the Compiled Code: the prohibition on donations from non-students and the candidate expenditure limit. | ||
Kisswani admitted to accepting an in-kind donation of campaign stickers from her sister, Heedaya Kisswani, who was not enrolled at the university. Kisswani was therefore accused of violating [[Elections Code |Compiled Code Article IV]] § 7.4.1.2, the "Donation Rule," which prohibits donations from individuals who are not University of Michigan students. Additionally, Kisswani conceded that she exceeded the $125 "Campaign Expenditure Limit" imposed by Compiled Code Article IV § 7.5.1. | Kisswani admitted to accepting an in-kind donation of campaign stickers from her sister, Heedaya Kisswani, who was not enrolled at the university. Kisswani was therefore accused of violating [[Elections Code |Compiled Code Article IV]] § 7.4.1.2, the "Donation Rule," which prohibits donations from individuals who are not University of Michigan students. Additionally, Kisswani conceded that she exceeded the $125 "Campaign Expenditure Limit" imposed by Compiled Code Article IV § 7.5.1. | ||
Kisswani challenged both rules as violating her constitutional rights to free speech. | Kisswani challenged both rules as violating her constitutional rights to free speech. The case was heard by a three-Justice panel. | ||
== Holding == | == Holding == | ||
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When considering the standard of review, the Court rejected the Independent Special Prosecutor's argument that ''[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/336/1065/2526392/ Flint v. Dennison]'' required a relaxed inquiry. The Court distinguished Flint as inapposite, explaining that it addressed whether the federal First Amendment permits a university to restrict student government campaign expenditures, whereas the current case asked whether CSG itself could impose such restrictions under its own Constitution. | When considering the standard of review, the Court rejected the Independent Special Prosecutor's argument that ''[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/336/1065/2526392/ Flint v. Dennison]'' required a relaxed inquiry. The Court distinguished Flint as inapposite, explaining that it addressed whether the federal First Amendment permits a university to restrict student government campaign expenditures, whereas the current case asked whether CSG itself could impose such restrictions under its own Constitution. | ||
The Court also addressed its own precedent, noting that a previous advisory opinion's discussion of limited public forums was non-binding dicta, and | The Court also addressed its own precedent, noting that a previous advisory opinion's discussion of limited public forums was non-binding dicta, and effectively abrogating [[Parikh v. University Elections Commission (2012)|''Parikh v. UEC'' (2012)]]'s reasonableness review of regulations on campaign-related speech. | ||
Applying [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strict%20scrutiny strict scrutiny], the Court evaluated whether the Expenditure Limit was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. The ISP offered two interests: equity in elections and preventing "unjust" spending. The Court rejected the equity rationale, citing ''Buckley'' and [[Szendro-Arceo et al. v. College of LSA Student Government & Joyce Jung (2024)|''Szendro-Arceo et. al. v. LSASG & Jung'' (2024)]] in concluding that restricting speech to equalize candidates' financial resources contradicts free speech principles. The Court also found this interest "so vague that it renders narrow tailoring analysis impossible." The Court similarly dismissed the interest in preventing "unjust" spending as fundamentally at odds with the Free Speech Clause, which protects against governmental determinations of appropriate speech levels. | Applying [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strict%20scrutiny strict scrutiny], the Court evaluated whether the Expenditure Limit was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. The ISP offered two interests: equity in elections and preventing "unjust" spending. The Court rejected the equity rationale, citing ''Buckley'' and [[Szendro-Arceo et al. v. College of LSA Student Government & Joyce Jung (2024)|''Szendro-Arceo et. al. v. LSASG & Jung'' (2024)]] in concluding that restricting speech to equalize candidates' financial resources contradicts free speech principles. The Court also found this interest "so vague that it renders narrow tailoring analysis impossible." The Court similarly dismissed the interest in preventing "unjust" spending as fundamentally at odds with the Free Speech Clause, which protects against governmental determinations of appropriate speech levels. | ||
===Concurrence=== | ===Concurrence=== | ||
Associate Chief Justice Lobbezoo filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Bidari, focusing on the flaws in the Court's earlier decision in [[Parikh v. University Elections Commission (2012)|''Parikh v. UEC'' (2012)]]. While agreeing that ''Parikh'' did not control the present case, Lobbezoo went further, characterizing Parikh's free speech analysis as "deeply flawed" and criticized it for "inhabiting a law-free zone." | Associate Chief Justice Kenichi Lobbezoo filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alex Bidari, focusing on the flaws in the Court's earlier decision in [[Parikh v. University Elections Commission (2012)|''Parikh v. UEC'' (2012)]]. While agreeing that ''Parikh'' did not control the present case, Lobbezoo went further, characterizing Parikh's free speech analysis as "deeply flawed" and criticized it for "inhabiting a law-free zone." | ||
The concurrence identified several specific problems with Parikh's approach: it invoked ''Buckley v. Valeo'' but adopted an inconsistent approach; relied on precedents unrelated to the Free Speech Clause; suggested that legislative intent to restrict speech favored a restriction's constitutionality; implied speech restrictions were acceptable as long as some expression remained; and subordinated constitutional rights to policy judgments of "nine unelected students." | The concurrence identified several specific problems with Parikh's approach: it invoked ''Buckley v. Valeo'' but adopted an inconsistent approach; relied on precedents unrelated to the Free Speech Clause; suggested that legislative intent to restrict speech favored a restriction's constitutionality; implied speech restrictions were acceptable as long as some expression remained; and subordinated constitutional rights to policy judgments of "nine unelected students." | ||
Lobbezoo observed that more recent decisions recognized a Free Speech Clause quite different from what ''Parikh'' imagined. While acknowledging that Parikh's outdated framework had been limited to its facts, the concurrence expressed concern about letting it "lie about like a loaded weapon ready to be brandished by the hand of any authority in a future case" (quoting Justice Jackson's dissent in ''[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korematsu_v._United_States Korematsu]''). | Lobbezoo observed that more recent decisions recognized a Free Speech Clause quite different from what ''Parikh'' imagined. While acknowledging that Parikh's outdated framework had been limited to its facts, the concurrence expressed concern about letting it "lie about like a loaded weapon ready to be brandished by the hand of any authority in a future case" (quoting Justice Jackson's dissent in ''[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korematsu_v._United_States Korematsu]''). | ||
Though the opinion of the court | Though the opinion of the court effective abrogated the underlying reasoning of ''Parikh'', the concurrence suggested explicitly overruling ''Parikh'''s free speech analysis altogether. | ||