Independent Special Prosecutor v. Kisswani (2024): Difference between revisions

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The Court contrasted this with the Expenditure Limit's explicit regulation of candidate conduct, which specifically states that candidates "may expend up to" a certain amount. This textual difference reinforced the Court's conclusion that the Donation Rule does not cover a candidate's acceptance of donations from non-students.
The Court contrasted this with the Expenditure Limit's explicit regulation of candidate conduct, which specifically states that candidates "may expend up to" a certain amount. This textual difference reinforced the Court's conclusion that the Donation Rule does not cover a candidate's acceptance of donations from non-students.


The Court acknowledged that this interpretation might seem odd since it creates a prohibition without a penalty (as CSG cannot penalize non-students for making improper donations). However, the Court rejected applying the "absurdity canon" of interpretation, noting that the result was merely "odd" rather than truly "absurd," and that correcting it would require more than a minor technical alteration of the text.
The Court acknowledged that its interpretation might seem odd since it creates a prohibition without a penalty (as CSG cannot penalize non-students for making improper donations). However, the Court rejected applying the "absurdity canon" of interpretation, noting that the result was merely "odd" rather than truly "absurd," and that correcting it would require more than a minor technical alteration of the text.


The Court also rejected the "presumption against ineffectiveness" canon, explaining that such a presumption only applies when choosing between multiple textually permissible interpretations, and here the language simply did not allow for an interpretation that covered candidates' acceptance of contributions.
The Court also rejected the "presumption against ineffectiveness" canon, explaining that such a presumption only applies when choosing between multiple textually permissible interpretations, and here the language simply did not allow for an interpretation that covered candidates' acceptance of contributions.