Independent Special Prosecutor v. Kisswani (2024): Difference between revisions
Added to infocard, corrected overrule Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit |
→Campaign Expenditure Limit: Reasonableness Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit |
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When considering the standard of review, the Court rejected the Independent Special Prosecutor's argument that ''[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/336/1065/2526392/ Flint v. Dennison]'' required a relaxed inquiry. The Court distinguished Flint as inapposite, explaining that it addressed whether the federal First Amendment permits a university to restrict student government campaign expenditures, whereas the current case asked whether CSG itself could impose such restrictions under its own Constitution. | When considering the standard of review, the Court rejected the Independent Special Prosecutor's argument that ''[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/336/1065/2526392/ Flint v. Dennison]'' required a relaxed inquiry. The Court distinguished Flint as inapposite, explaining that it addressed whether the federal First Amendment permits a university to restrict student government campaign expenditures, whereas the current case asked whether CSG itself could impose such restrictions under its own Constitution. | ||
The Court also addressed its own precedent, noting that a previous advisory opinion's discussion of limited public forums was non-binding dicta, and | The Court also addressed its own precedent, noting that a previous advisory opinion's discussion of limited public forums was non-binding dicta, and effectively abrogating [[Parikh v. University Elections Commission (2012)|''Parikh v. UEC'' (2012)]]'s reasonableness review of regulations on campaign-related speech. | ||
Applying [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strict%20scrutiny strict scrutiny], the Court evaluated whether the Expenditure Limit was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. The ISP offered two interests: equity in elections and preventing "unjust" spending. The Court rejected the equity rationale, citing ''Buckley'' and [[Szendro-Arceo et al. v. College of LSA Student Government & Joyce Jung (2024)|''Szendro-Arceo et. al. v. LSASG & Jung'' (2024)]] in concluding that restricting speech to equalize candidates' financial resources contradicts free speech principles. The Court also found this interest "so vague that it renders narrow tailoring analysis impossible." The Court similarly dismissed the interest in preventing "unjust" spending as fundamentally at odds with the Free Speech Clause, which protects against governmental determinations of appropriate speech levels. | Applying [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strict%20scrutiny strict scrutiny], the Court evaluated whether the Expenditure Limit was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. The ISP offered two interests: equity in elections and preventing "unjust" spending. The Court rejected the equity rationale, citing ''Buckley'' and [[Szendro-Arceo et al. v. College of LSA Student Government & Joyce Jung (2024)|''Szendro-Arceo et. al. v. LSASG & Jung'' (2024)]] in concluding that restricting speech to equalize candidates' financial resources contradicts free speech principles. The Court also found this interest "so vague that it renders narrow tailoring analysis impossible." The Court similarly dismissed the interest in preventing "unjust" spending as fundamentally at odds with the Free Speech Clause, which protects against governmental determinations of appropriate speech levels. | ||